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Abstract
We ￿nd that a discount rate of 3.8% allows us to derive the schedule
of "value of life years" in Murphy and Topel [2006] from their schedule
of "value of remaining years of life", this latter presumably being based
on a "value of statistical life" of $6.3 milliion. We draw on the Makeham
function for life expectancy in our calculation.
￿ journal classi￿cation: J170, I100
￿ key words: value of life, discount rate, life expectancy
1. Introduction
Murphy and Topel [2006] provide two interesting graphs (Figures 2 and 3) in their
paper on the value of health improvements and the extension of human lifespan.
In Figure 2, they present "value of life year" estimates for a representative male
and female, ages 20 to 110, in say the United States and in Figure 3 they present
"value of remaining life" estimates for ages 0 to 110. These latter ￿gures are
￿Boyan Jovanovic suggested to me that a "value of life year" should be obtainable from the
derivative of the corresponding "value of remaining years of life" and this we have pursued here.
Thanks to him and to participants in a seminar at McGill University in March, 2009. Bob
Cairns kindly provided a careful critique of an earlier draft of this note.
1capital values while the former are ￿ ow values per year. The value of life year
numbers rise smoothly from $200,000 per year at age 20 to $360,000 at age 50 and
then decline with a gentle point of in￿ ection to $70,000 at age 110. The values
for the representative female lie slightly above those for the representative male.
The value of remaining years of life numbers rise smoothly from $6,700,000 at
age 20 to $6,900,000 at age 30 and decline smoothly to zero at age 110 with a
point of in￿ ection. At age 40 a male￿ s value of remaining years is $6.3 million,
the same as the $6.3 million "value of a statistical life" favored by Murphy and
Topel. There is no explicit "documentation" linking these two ￿gures; in particular
no report of a discount rate employed or a life expectancy table or function.
Here we tie these two series together by invoking a discount rate of 3.8% and an
explicit life expectancy function, namely the Makeham life expectancy function,
parameterized by Gavrilov and Gavrilova [1991; p. 76]. The Makeham function
is an extension of the Gompertz life expectancy function and has an additional
parameter that allows for a decline in the probability of dying after a person passes
through infancy. Our exercise provides a complete "theory" and accounting for
the claim that 3.8 represents a highly plausible value for a representative agent￿ s
consumption discount rate.
We exploit the idea that the capital value for remaining years of life at age x
has a time derivative that "breaks out" the current value of a life year. Hence a
time series of say life year estimates implies a time series of values of remaining
years of life, given a life expectancy function and a discount rate, and vice versa.
With a discount rate of 3.8%, we are able to generate the graph in Table 3 of
Murphy and Topel from age 20 to age 54 from the data in the graph in Table 2.
Beyond age 54 our "values of remaining years of life" decline too rapidly relative
to those in Murphy and Topel￿ s Figure 3 (to zero at age 76 rather than to zero
at age 110). Thus 3.8% appears to emerge as a true discount rate employed byindividuals up to age 54 but beyond this age, Murphy and Topel have "value of
life years" that are too large for a discount rate of 3.8%, too large relative to the
values in the schedule of "value of remaining years of life" (Table 3). Given our
recursive equation (from our discrete time derivative), including now the discount
rate of 3.8%, we proceed to calculate a schedule of lower value of life years beyond
age 54 for our representative agent. These new values bring the revised schedules
in Figures 2 and 3 into "compatibility" for a consumption discount rate of 3.8%.
(We could instead have solved for the stated capital values beyond age 54, using
the stated value of life years, and new discount rates for each year beyond age 54
above 3.8%.)
Though Murphy and Topel develop a fairly complete theory of a life-time
consumption pro￿le for a representative agent facing an uncertain span of life,
they present few details of their "parameterization" of the model, essentially the
process for generating the data in their Figure 3. A ￿rst-blush inference is that
they sketched a life-time series of values of statistical life for a representative agent,
with $6.3 million for age 40 as a reference point, and then backed out a series of
value of life years. Precisely how they carried out the numerical backing out is
not documented. We provide complete details here for linking their schedules in
Figures 2 and 3 together and in that process arrive at a consumption discount
rate of 3.8%. Murphy and Topel state that they generated their value of life
years schedule ￿rst from standard sources and then generated their schedule of
values of remaining years of life with the ￿rst series. The second series contains
that important reference point, namely the value of remaining years of life at
age 40 is precisely $6.3 million. So they may well have tried various values of
the consumption discount rate until the second schedule passed through the $6.3
million dollar value for "the person" at age 40. To get this ￿t, they require
a discount rate and as we just noted provide no information on this importantissue. Here we ￿nd that a discount rate of 3.8% works, given the Makeham life
expectancy function for the calculations.
2. The Analysis





the hazard function and S(t) the survival function. This latter is a distribution
function and ￿dS
dt is the density function h(t)S(t); with
R 1
0 h(t)S(t)dt = 1: The
function h(t)
S(t)




S(z)dt = 1: If one dies, say





We investigate, instead of the age one would have attained, the current or present
value of the "income" one would have attained. "Income" data are reported in
Table 2 of Murphy and Topel. In our exercise, we will make use of the Makeham
life expectancy function, S(t) = expf￿Bt ￿ ￿
￿fexp(￿t) ￿ 1gg: This corresponds
to the density h(t)S(t) with h(t) = [B + ￿exp(￿t)]: For a group of Swedish men,
Gavrilov and Gavrilova ￿nd that ￿ = 0:0000274; ￿ = 0:104; and B = 0:00374
yields a good estimate of life expectancy at birth of 71.4 years in 1925.1 Starting
at age 40, life expectancy rises to 80 years. They recommend reducing the value
of B to capture an increase in the life expectancy of Swedish men since the 1920￿ s
(p. 77). We proceed to work with ￿ = 0:0000274; ￿ = 0:104; and B = 0:0000006:
The ￿rst two parameters are recommended by Gavrilov and Gavrilova (p. 76).
We change their value of B to a low number to re￿ ect the longer life expectancy
of a Swedish male since the 1920￿ s. Our parameter values yield a life expectancy
at birth of 83.31 (standard deviation of 12.30), at age 20 of 83.36 (st. dev. 12.16),
at age 30 of 83.44 (st. dev. 11.96), at age 40 of 83.64 (st. dev. 11.58), at age 50
1In the literature on life expectancy, observers note that for base years of say 30 to 50, the
Gompertz function (Makeham function with B = 0) works fairly well. But specialists are always
seeking functions that ￿t the data better (eg. Bebbington, Lai, and Zitikis [2007]).of 84.06 (st. dev. 10.87), at age 60 of 84.96 (st. dev. 9.71), and at 70 of 86.72 (st.
dev. 8.26).
If one dies, say in an accident at age 30, one foregoes the stream of utility
to year x; in
R x
30 u(c(v))exp(￿￿(v ￿ 30))dv (= L(x)) with probability h(x)
S(x)
S(30)
and discount rate ￿. Hence unexpected death at age 30 results in an average or




S(30)dv: Viscusi [2004] and
others have provided estimates of the value of a life cut short by an accident. These
are the so-called "values of a statistical life". As we noted above, Murphy and
Topel select $6.3 million as their favored estimate for "the value of a statistical





S(30)dv = $6;300;000 if we have dollar values for the u(c(t))0s
and a function for S(t): Murphy and Topel provide the required dollar values for
the u(c(t))0s in their Figure 2 and Gavrilov and Gavrilova provide the required
function S(t); namely the Makeham function, in their monograph.2 Hence we
could solve for the true consumption discount rate ￿; for an individual at age 30
in the above equation.
We are to think of the u(c(t))0s as emerging from utility maximization over
an uncertain lifespan by a representative agent. Given these optimized values,





values of t: Murphy and Topel set out dollar values for each u(c￿(t)); our mt
0s;
and then present in Figure 3 the derived schedule of V (t)0s: They de￿ne the "value
of life year" (p. 881), m(t) as the representative agent￿ s value of her current "full
consumption" weighted by "surplus per dollar of full consumption" plus "full
income". On page 880 "full income and consumption" are de￿ned by "adding
2The well-known Gompertz function is the Makeham function above with B = 0: The positive
B parameter captures a somewhat "high" probability of death in infancy.the shadow value of non-market time to each". In addition lifetime income is
smoothed so that the is a ￿ ow of income to a person in retirement (post age 65).
The value of a life year is then current consumption in dollars plus current value
of leisure in dollars. The series is reported to be constructed from actual life-cycle
wage and consumption data. However there is no information on the function
S(t) used or on the discount rate employed in moving from the schedule of mt
0s
to the schedule of V (t)0s: Here we ￿nd that a discount rate of 3.8% works in the
"translation" from mt
0s to V (t)0s and we draw on the Makeham function for our
S(t) in this "translation".
Instead of solving for various distinct values for the V (t) 0s directly, given
the schedule of mt




S(t)dx; "breaking out" an expression for mt for each date, and solving
for a schedule of V (t)0s in a recursive fashion. In particular we are interested in
arriving at a value for the discount rate that allows us to generate the data in
Figure 3, given those in Figure 2. We de￿ne ￿ = 1=(1+￿) and use time subscripts
to make our expressions more compact. For u(c(t)) we now have dollar valued mt:
We consider the time derivative in discrete time.3
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dt = ￿mt + [￿ + ht]V (t):If we multiply Vt+1 on both sides by ￿
St+1




















Stdz; this latter equalling unity. Hence
we have the basic recursion






This is the equation that we employed to generate a schedule of Vt
0s; given the
schedule of mt
0s in Figure 2 of Murphy and Topel. For St we drew on the
Makeham function with parameters reported above. We obtained an excellent
replication of Murphy and Topel￿ s Vt
0s in their Figure 3 with ￿ = 3:8% up to age
54. Beyond age 54, our Vt
0s declined too rapidly. We observed that the value
of life years in Murphy and Topel￿ s Figure 2 are too large for years beyond age
54. To complete our investigation of a 3.8% discount rate, we simply reversed our
"thinking" at age 54 and invoked the Murphy-Topel "value of remaining years
of life" schedule and solved for the remaining schedule of mt
0s (the value of life
years). At age 65, we worked out mt = $276;351:8 in place of the Murphy-Topel
$300,000; at age 75, we worked out mt = $185;344:2 in place of the Murphy-Topel
$214,000; at age 85, we worked out mt = $118;764:3 in place of the Murphy-Topel
$140;000; and at age 95, we worked out mt = $90;000 in place of the Murphy-
Topel $105,000. Hence with relatively minor changes to the "primary data", we
found that a consumption discount rate of 3.8% works well in the "translation"
of the data in Murphy and Topel￿ s Figure 2 to those in Figure 3.
Since S(t + 1)=S(t) ￿ = (1 ￿ h(t)); our basic recursion can be expressed as








VtThis in continuous time is
mt + dVt=dt
Vt
= ￿ + ht:
The capital theory here4 is that Vt is capturing the uncertain present value of
a non-stochastic stream of earnings, mt: Since ht is the probability of our rep-
resentative agent dying in the current period, the current earnings of our asset
(the representative agent), namely
mt+dVt=dt
Vt "requires" a risk premium, above the
certain rate, ￿: It is reasonable to argue that ht rises signi￿cantly for our person
above say age 70 and in addition that Vt becomes relatively small and unchanging.
Thus mt might not be relatively small for a person above 70 and this we observe
for the mt schedule in Murphy and Topel, as well as in our adjusted mt schedule.
This is something of a paradox. Our representative agent exhibits a very low
value of statistical life (measured here by Vt) in old age while also exhibiting a
not-so-low value of life year. Beyond age 30, the representative agent in Murphy
and Topel ends up with her capital value ever declining. This implies of course
that
dVt=dt
Vt is negative for much of the agent￿ s life and this tends to shift mt
0s
upward over the latter "stages" of the agent￿ s life. One can argue that the reason
that Murphy and Topel have a schedule of mt
0s above ours for our agent beyond
age 54 is that they worked with a schedule of larger ht
0s for the agent beyond age
54. Our ht
0s emerge from the Makeham life expectancy function, parameterized
by Gavrilov and Gavrilova.
4One should resist the temptation to treat Vt+1 ￿ = (1 + ￿)Vt in the discrete time expression
since that would imply that
Vt+1￿Vt
Vt
￿ = ￿: And this latter relationship would imply that mt=Vt ￿ =
ht; a very special result.3. Comment
In fact, Murphy and Topel report the use of a discount rate of 3% later in their
article and one might infer that this is the value that they used in "translating"
their value of a life year estimates into their "value of remaining years of life" es-
timates. But this remains a conjecture. They also left unclear what function they
were using for our S(t) and whatever function they chose may have contributed
to the di⁄erence we are observing in "the" discount rate (our 3.8 compared with
say their 3%). When extra risk is involved later in their article, they suggest
using the estimate of 3:5% in calculations. In any case we have linked their two
striking plots together with an explicit life expectancy function and a discount
rate of 3.8%. Some other calculations we carried out support our view that a
discount rate of between 3.5 and 4% works well in linking up the two central se-
ries in Murphy and Topel. We think that a dispassionate reader would ￿nd the
estimates for the values of remaining years of life plausible, given what is claimed
for estimates of the values of statistical life. Hence the plausibility of our 3.8%
estimate for the discount rate really rests on the matter of the plausibility of the
values Murphy and Topel have arrived at for the values of life years. Such series
have not been worked out by many other investigators and thus the reader is left
to scrutinize what Murphy and Topel have to say on this matter. We have quoted
their thinking in brief above.
Finally, we note that a di⁄erent approach might consider the agent￿ s discount
rate declining with age a priori, as with hyperbolic discounting (eg. Azfar[1999]).
This would require an approach more complicated than ours to linking the two
key schedules in Murphy and Topel together.References
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